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I. Introduction
Significant developments in the law of recognition and
enforcement of judgments have occurred on national, regional, and
international levels in the first fifteen years of the twenty-first
century. In the European Union (EU), the Brussels I Regulation,
originally implemented in 2001,' was "recast" with new rules that
became effective on January 10, 2015.2 In the United States, the
Uniform Law Commissioners (ULC) promulgated a new Uniform
Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act.' The ULC
also proposed a Choice of Court Agreements Convention
Implementation Act,4 designed to implement, on the state level,
the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements.5 At the
same time, the American Law Institute (ALI)prepared a Proposed
Federal Statute to govern the recognition and enforcement of
foreign judgments. 6 The U.S. Supreme Court, in Goodyear
Dunlop Tires Operations v. Brown and Daimler, brought U.S.
general jurisdiction law more in line with that found in the EU's
Brussels I Regulation, potentially removing one of the major
objections to U.S. jurisdictional reach and thus to the potential
recognition of U.S. judgments abroad.7 On the multilateral level,
the Hague Conference on Private International Law completed the

I Council Regulation 44/2001, Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement
of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 2001 O.J. (L 012) 1, 1-23 (EC)
[hereinafter Brussels I Regulation].
2 Regulation 1215/2012, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12
December 2012 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in
Civil and Commercial Matters (recast), 2012 O.J. (L 351) 1, 20 (EU) (noting that under
Article 81 the Recast Regulation "shall apply from 10 January 2015, with the exception
of Articles 75 and 76, which shall apply from 10 January 2014") [hereinafter Brussels I
Recast Regulation].
3 NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIF.
COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION

STATE LAWS,

UNIF. FOREIGN-

ACT §§ 1-13 (2005) [hereinafter 2005

RECOGNITION ACT].
4 NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, CHOICE OF COURT
1-32 (2012) [hereinafter CHOICE OF

AGREEMENTS CONVENTION IMPLEMENTATION ACT §§

COURT AGREEMENTS CONVENTION IMPLEMENTATION ACT].

5 Id. at § 2.
6 AM. L. INST., RECOGNITION & ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS: ANALYSIS

[hereinafter ALl ENFORCEMENT
JUDGMENTS].
7 Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S. A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. _,
2846 (2011); Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 310, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014).
AND PROPOSED FEDERAL STATUTE (2005)

OF FOREIGN

131 S.Ct.
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2005 Convention on Choice of Court Agreements 8 with Mexico
acceding in 2007' and the European Union prepared to ratify in
2015.'0 More recently, the Hague Conference has convened a
Working Group on Judgments to pursue a broader judgments
recognition convention on a global scale."'
While these developments represent substantial progress,
roadblocks to further development have arisen, in part as a result
of these same developments. The Recast of the Brussels I
Regulation was accomplished without adopting the original
Commission proposal that would have prevented national bases of
exorbitant jurisdiction that remain applicable in Member State
courts against defendants from outside the EU. 2 This makes the
recognition of resulting judgments more suspect and difficult
outside of the European Union. In the United States, the ULC's
Choice of Court Agreements Convention Implementation Act is in
direct conflict with the ALI Proposed Federal Statute in terms of
state or federal sources for the basic law on judgments
recognition. 3 This creates a further conflict regarding the method
of U.S. implementation of the Choice of Court Convention that
has stalled that treaty's ratification by the United States. The split
U.S. Supreme Court decision in McIntyre Machinery v. Nicastro
prevents any real certainty on U.S. rules of specific jurisdiction,
8 HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, CONVENTION OF 30 JUNE
2005 ON CHOICE OF COURT AGREEMENTS,

http://www.hcch.net/index-en.php?act=

conventions.text&cid=98 (providing text and outline in PDF form for the Convention)
(last visited Mar. 22, 2015) [hereinafter CHOICE OF COURT CONVENTION].
9 HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, STATUS TABLE:
CONVENTION OF 30 JUNE 2005 ON CHOICE OF COURT AGREEMENTS, http://www.hcch.net
/indexen.php?act=conventions.status&cid=98 (providing status table for the Choice of
Court Convention) (last visited Mar. 22, 2015) [hereinafter CHOICE OF COURT
CONVENTION STATUS TABLE].
10 See Council Decision 2014/887, on the approval, on behalf of the European
Union, of the Hague Convention of 30 June 2005 on Choice of Court Agreements, 2014

O.J. (L353) 5 (EU).
II See HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, CONCLUSIONS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS ADOPTED BY THE COUNCIL § 6 (Council on General Affairs & Policy

of the Conference 2014).
12 See Proposalfor a Regulation of the European Parliamentand of the Council on
Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and

Commercial Matters (Recast), at 7, 15, COM (2010) 748 final (Dec. 14, 2010)
[hereinafter Brussels I Recast Proposal].
13 Compare CHOICE OF COURT AGREEMENTS IMPLEMENTATION ACT, supra note 4,
with ALl ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS, supra note 6.
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and limits specific jurisdiction in a manner that places U.S. rules
further at odds with those in the European Union and elsewhere in
the world. 4 This makes agreement on jurisdictional tests for
judgments recognition purposes more difficult than when they
were considered in the Hague Conference in 1992-2001." 5
For those who follow these developments, how one views the
current situation can be a function of proximity of both place and
time. Thus, as with many areas of the law, we too often engage in
a failure of comparative law analysis. We assume that other legal
systems treat an issue in the same manner as we do, without giving
full consideration to actual differences in the legal systems. In
addition, as we move forward in time, we tend to develop views of
historic legal precedents that are not always fully consistent with
the complete analysis contained in those precedents.
In this article, I address both problems of proximity by
reviewing what I believe are two common views of current law
that may not be fully consistent with the sources of that law which
are being considered. The first is the problem of proximity of
place. In the United States, this problem has resulted in the failure
to understand the gap that exists in some other legal systems
between the bases of jurisdiction on which courts are allowed to
hear a case in the first instance (bases of direct jurisdiction) and
the bases of jurisdiction courts will accept as appropriate in the
originating court of another state for purposes of the recognition of
the resulting judgment (bases of indirect jurisdiction).
The second problem of proximity is one of time. While the
seminal U.S. text on judgments recognition in both state and16
federal courts is Justice Gray's 1895 opinion in Hilton v. Guyot,
developments over time have resulted in a focus on only part of
that text, leaving the possibility that significant qualifying
language in the same text may help us find a path to a better
understanding of judgments recognition law in the twenty-first
century.

14 McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011).
15 See HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, INTERIM TEXT SUMMARY OF THE OUTCOME OF THE DISCUSSION IN COMMISSION II OF THE FIRST PART OF

THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE (Permanent Bureau & Co-Reporters
http://www.hcch.net/index-en.php?act-publications.details&pid=3499&dtid=35
visited Mar. 22, 2015) [hereinafter HAGUE CONFERENCE, INTERIM TEXT].
16 Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895).

2001),
(last
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In the discussion that follows, I begin with a review of recent
developments in judgments recognition law. After the review, I
first consider the problem of proximity of place, and the resulting
U.S. failure to fully realize and understand the impact of the direct
jurisdiction/indirect jurisdiction gap in some other countries of the
world. I then consider the impact of the failure to recognize and
deal with this jurisdictional gap. I follow with consideration of the
problem of proximity of time, by revisiting the language of Justice
Gray's opinion in Hilton v. Guyot."7 This allows consideration of
both the language that has continued to be the focus of judicial and
scholarly opinion and other language of the opinion that provided
the context for the oft-quoted phrases. It is this other language that
may well provide direction for current developments. I close with
comments on how a clearer understanding of these two problems
of proximity may aid in making further progress in judgments
recognition law as we move forward.
II. Recent Developments
A. Developments in the European Union
The publication in December 2000 of the Brussels I Regulation
confirmed the consolidation of competence for issues of
jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in
the institutions of what is now the European Union. 8 Like the
Brussels I Convention before it,' 9 the Regulation sets rules within
the EU on jurisdiction in Member State courts over defendants
from other Member States and on the recognition and enforcement
of judgments from the courts of other Member States.20 It leaves
to Member State national law, for the most part, the questions of
Id.
18 Brussels I Regulation, supra note 1.
19 European Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters, done at Brussels, Sept. 27, 1968, 1990 O.J. SPEC. ED. (C 189) 1
(consolidated and updated version of the 1968 Convention and the Protocol of 1971,
following the 1989 accession of Spain and Portugal) [hereinafter Brussels Convention].
The Convention was also subject to the Convention on the Accession of the Republic of
Austria, the Republic of Finland, and the Kingdom of Sweden, done at Brussels,
Nov. 29, 1996, 1996 O.J. (C 15) 1 (EC). The Brussels Convention was generally
replaced by the Brussels I Regulation in 2001.
20 See Brussels I Recast Regulation, supra note 2, art. 2 (defining for purposes of
the regulation, "member states of origin," "member state addressed," and "court of
origin" among other terms).
17
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jurisdiction over defendants from outside the European Union and
the recognition and enforcement of judgments from outside the
European Union.2 Importantly, however, when a Member State
court does take jurisdiction over a defendant from outside the EU
on a basis of jurisdiction that would be considered exorbitant and
not allowed against an EU defendant, the Regulation provides for
the recognition and enforcement of that judgment throughout
Europe.22 This provides a system of discrimination against foreign
defendants that has been criticized.
In 2010, the European Commission produced a draft Recast of
the Brussels I Regulation.23 That document provided both for
updated rules for internal jurisdiction and recognition of judgments
law and for the removal of the discriminatory operation of the
Regulation that allows jurisdiction over defendants domiciled
outside Europe under exorbitant national jurisdiction rules that are
prohibited when the defendant is domiciled in an EU Member
State.24
Recast Regulation 1215/2012, as finally approved, did not
include the extension of the Regulation to external defendants.25
Thus, bases of jurisdiction considered to be exorbitant - the use of
which is prohibited against defendants domiciled within the EU remain applicable in Member States against non-EU defendants.
Such provisions include, for example, Article 14 of the French
Civil Code (providing for general jurisdiction over foreign
defendants when the plaintiff is a French citizen), 26 and Article 23
of the German Code of Civil Procedure (providing for general
jurisdiction over a foreign defendant based on the presence of

Id. art. 6 (providing for jurisdiction of the courts in each Member state whenever
the defendant is not domiciled in a Member state).
22 Id. arts. 6, 36(l).
23 Brussels I Recast Proposal, supra note 12.
24 Id. at 21-23. Article 3 of the original Brussels I Regulation protected defendants
domiciled in an EU Member State from the operation of national jurisdictional rules
found to be objectionable. Article 4 provided that those rules continue to apply against
defendants domiciled outside the European Union. The Commission originally proposed
the deletion of Article 4 and a new Article 3(2) that would make defendants domiciled
outside the European Union subject to the same jurisdictional rules as those domiciled
within the European Union, subject to some additional rules in Section 8 of Chapter II of
the Regulation.
25 Brussels I Recast Regulation, supra note 2.
26 CODE DE PROCIDURE CIVILE [C.P.C.] art. 14 (Fr.).
21

2015

UNDERSTANDING JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION

property owned by the defendant within the German jurisdiction regardless of the value of the property).27 Moreover, judgments
resulting from the exercise of such jurisdiction remain subject to
recognition and enforcement in other EU Member States. 2' Thus,
while the Brussels I system of internal jurisdiction rules generally
does not apply to defendants from outside the EU, the
accompanying rules on recognition and enforcement operate to
extend the effect of clearly discriminatory national rules of
jurisdiction through the system of relatively free movement of
judgments within the European Union.
B. Developments in the United States
In the United States, twenty-first century developments in
judgments recognition law have come from a number of sources.
The resulting instruments have not always been consistent, and
have at times been in conflict. Thus, an understanding of these
instruments helps facilitate an understanding of the tensions
currently in play in the development of judgments recognition law
in the United States.
1. The Uniform Law Commission
The Uniform Law Commission (formerly known as the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
(NCCUSL)) adopted a revision of its 1962 Uniform Foreign
Money-Judgments Recognition Act in 2005, designating it the
Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act.29
While the new Recognition Act added significant changes to the
1962 Act, it also represents a statement by the ULC of its
continued interest in seeing judgments recognition law governed
by state law in the United States. 30 This latter element is most

27 ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG

[ZPO] [CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE],

Jan. 30,

1877,

REICHSGEESETZBLATT [RGBL.] 83, as amended, § 23 (Ger.).

28 Brussels I Recast Regulation, supra note 2, art. 36(1).
29 2005 Recognition Act, supra note 3; see also UNIF. FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS
RECOGNITION ACT (1962) [hereinafter 1962 RECOGNITION ACT].

30 The 2005 Act directly addresses the questions of procedure that were unclear
under the 1962 Act, making clear that a judgment creditor must file an action to obtain
recognition. 2005 Recognition Act, supra note 3, § 6. It also clarifies issues of burden
of proof, giving to the party seeking recognition the burden of proving that the judgment
falls within the scope of the Act, and to the party seeking non-recognition the burden of
proving any of the grounds available for non-recognition. Id. §§ 3(c), 4(d). The 2005
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clearly demonstrated in the ULC's Uniform Choice of Court
Agreements Convention Implementation Act, designed to
implement the 2005 Hague Convention on Choice of Court
Agreements through uniform state laws that would supplement,
and sometimes prevail over, the accompanying federal
implementing legislation."
2. The American Law Institute
In the same year in which the ULC produced its new
Recognition Act, the American Law Institute completed its 2005
Proposed Federal Statute on Recognition and Enforcement of
Contrary to the ULC's position that judgments
Judgments.
recognition law should be determined primarily by state law, even
in cases tried in federal court, the ALI project was based on
determinations that (1) the federal government has the authority
"as inherent in the sovereignty of the nation, or as derived from the
national power over foreign relations shared by Congress and the
Executive, or as derived from the power to regulate commerce
with foreign nations, 33 to govern the recognition and enforcement
of foreign judgments, and (2) "a coherent federal statute is the best
solution" for addressing "a national problem with a national
solution., 34 While the ALl project began as an effort to draft a
federal implementing statute for U.S. participation in the proposed
jurisdiction and judgments convention that had been the subject of
negotiation at the Hague Conference on Private International Law,
when the Hague project turned to a more limited Convention on
Act also provides a specific statute of limitations, prohibiting recognition any time after
the earlier of the date on which the foreign judgment is no longer enforceable in the
country of origin, or fifteen years from the time the judgment is effective in the country
of origin. Id. § 9. The 2005 Act also added three bases for non-recognition that had not
been included in the 1962 Act. It allows the public policy determination to be based on
review of either the judgment or the cause of action in the originating court, and adds
two new discretionary grounds for non-recognition when either "the judgment was
rendered in circumstances that raise substantial doubt about the integrity of the rendering
court with respect to the judgment," or "the specific proceeding in the foreign court
leading to the judgment was not compatible with the requirements of due process of
law." Id. § 4(c)(7) & (8).
31 CHOICE OF COURT AGREEMENTS CONVENTION IMPLEMENTATION ACT, supra note

4.
32 ALl ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS, supra note 6.
33 Id.at 3.
34 Id.at 6.
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Choice of Court Agreements, the ALl project also changed focus
and moved to the preparation of a general federal statute on
judgments recognition.
3. The U.S. Supreme Court
A basic rule of judgments recognition in nearly all legal
systems is that a court will not recognize a judgment from a court
that did not have jurisdiction to hear the case.35 In the United
States, this rule requires that the court have had both personal36
and subject matter37 jurisdiction. Personal jurisdiction is measured
not by the rules of the state of the court of origin, but by American
concepts of jurisdiction to adjudicate,38 focusing primarily on the
due process analysis developed by the United States Supreme
Court in International Shoe v. Washington and its progeny.39
This, of course, makes the development of the law of judicial
jurisdiction under the Due Process clauses in U.S. courts
applicable as well to the law of judgments recognition. The rules
of jurisdiction applied in the first instance are the same as those
rules applied to test the jurisdiction of foreign courts when their
judgments are brought for recognition in the United States.
In 2011 and 2014, the U.S. Supreme Court decided three cases
that continued to mold the law of personal jurisdiction. In 2011,
the Court addressed questions of general jurisdiction in Goodyear
v. Brown.4 ° In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Ginsburg,
35 What is not uniform is the set of rules of jurisdiction by which this requirement
will be tested. In the United States, those rules are the same as those applied to
determine jurisdiction in U.S. courts at the trial court level. See infra Section III. In
some countries, those rules of "indirect" jurisdiction are much more restrictive than what
is applied to determine jurisdiction in the first instance within the state being asked to
recognize the foreign judgment. See infra Section III.
36 2005 Recognition Act, supra note 3, § 4(b)(2); 1962 Recognition Act, supra note
29, § 4(a)(2); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 482(1)(b) (1987).
37 2005 Recognition Act, supra note 3, § 4(b)(3); 1962 Recognition Act, supra note
29 § 4(a)(3); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 482(2)(a) (1987).

38 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 482 cmt. c (1987);

see, e.g.,

Koster v. Automark Indus., Inc., 640 F.2d 77 (7th Cir. 1981); Mercandino v. Devoe &
Raynolds, Inc., 436 A.2d 942 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1981).
39 Int'l Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 311 (1945); see also McIntyre
Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2780 (2011); Asahi Metal Indus. Co., Ltd.
v. Superior Court of Cal. Solano Cnty., 480 U.S. 102 (1987); World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
40 Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011).
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the Court moved U.S. concepts of general jurisdiction closer to the
European approach in the Brussels I Regulation, which has a
simple "domicile of the defendant" test.4' Justice Ginsburg's
opinion refined the U.S. test, ultimately stating that "[a] court may
assert general jurisdiction over foreign [sister-state or foreigncountry] corporations to hear any and all claims against them when
their affiliations with the State are so 'continuous and systematic'
as to render them essentially at home in the forum State., 42 While
the decision did not explicitly go so far as to adopt a simple
"defendant's domicile" test, it did state that "[f]or an individual,
the paradigm forum for the exercise of general jurisdiction is the
individual's domicile; for a corporation, it is an equivalent place,
one in which the corporation is fairly regarded as at home."43
The Supreme Court also addressed questions of specific
jurisdiction on the same day as the Goodyear decision. In
Nicastro," the Court held that personal jurisdiction did not exist in
New Jersey state courts for a suit brought by a New Jersey resident
against a United Kingdom manufacturer of scrap metal machines
for injuries sustained when one of the machines, purchased by the
plaintiffs employer, allegedly malfunctioned and caused serious
injury. While six Justices agreed with the narrow holding, they
did so in divided opinions that provide no clear majority rule. In a
three-Justice dissent written by Justice Ginsburg, the diverging
opinions were delineated as follows:
A foreign industrialist seeks to develop a market in the United
States for machines it manufactures. It hopes to derive
41 Brussels I Recast Regulation, supra note 2, art. 4.
42 Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, 131 S. Ct. at 2851.

43 Id. at 2853-54. Whether there is any room between these concepts of domicile
and home remains to be seen. Footnote 6 of the Goodyear opinion is likely to receive
focus in the further development of whether any distinction continues to exist:
In the brief they filed in the North Carolina Court of Appeals, respondents stated
that petitioners were part of an "integrated world-wide efforts (sic) to design,
manufacture, market and sell their tires in the United States, including in North
Carolina.. . . "Read in context, that assertion was offered in support of a
narrower proposition: The distribution of petitioners' tires in North Carolina,
respondents maintained, demonstrated petitioners' own "calculated and
deliberate efforts to take advantage of the North Carolina market. As already
explained ... even regularly occurring sales of a product in a State do not justify
the exercise of jurisdiction over a claim unrelated to those sales." Id. at 2857 n.
6.
44 131 S.Ct. 2780 (2011).
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substantial revenue from sales it makes to United States
purchasers. Where in the United States buyers reside does not
matter to this manufacturer. Its goal is simply to sell as much as
it can, wherever it can. It excludes no region or State from the
market it wishes to reach. But, all things considered, it prefers
to avoid products liability litigation in the United States. To that
end, it engages a U.S. distributor to ship its machines stateside.
Has it succeeded in escaping personal jurisdiction in a State
where one of its products is sold and causes injury or even death
to a local user? Under this Court's pathmarking precedent in
InternationalShoe, and subsequent decisions, one would expect
the answer to be unequivocally, "No." But instead, six Justices
of this Court, in divergent opinions, tell us that the manufacturer
has avoided the jurisdiction of our State courts, except perhaps
in States where its products are sold in sizeable quantities.4 5
In January of 2014, the Supreme Court decided DaimlerAG v.
Bauman,46 holding that a German defendant, sued in California by
Argentine plaintiffs for acts occurring in Argentina, was not
subject to general jurisdiction, stating that,
[T]he inquiry under Goodyear is not whether a foreign
corporation's in-forum contacts can be said to be in some sense
"continuous and systematic," it is whether that corporation's
"affiliations with the State are so 'continuous and systematic' as
47
to render [it] essentially at home in the forum State.
This reaffirmed the language in Goodyear that moves the
United States very close to a simple "defendant's domicile" test
for general jurisdiction. As a result, prior concerns in other
countries about the long arm of "doing business" jurisdiction
seems now to be mitigated, and the extent to which such
jurisdiction could have been considered exorbitant in other
countries has essentially been reduced to zero. This should, in
turn, remove concerns about recognizing the resulting judgments
in courts of other states where original general jurisdiction is
defined using a defendant's domicile test.
C. InternationalDevelopments
The Hague Conference on Private International Law originally

45

Id. at 2794-95.

46

Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014).

47 Id. at

754.

N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.

Vol. XL

began a project focused on a global convention on jurisdiction and
the recognition and enforcement of judgments as the result of a
U.S. request in 1992." 8 This project changed course in 2001, when
it was determined to be too ambitious for conditions at the time.49
The ultimate result was a more limited Convention on Choice of
Court Agreements, which was completed in 2005.50
The Convention on Choice of Court Agreements had not yet
come into effect at the time this article was written. Mexico
acceded on September 26, 2007.5' Both the European Union and
the United States had signed, but had not yet ratified. 2 The EU
moved toward full ratification in 2015, coordinating its external
law on judgments recognition with the internal changes it has
made through the Brussels I Recast Regulation. 3 This would
make the Convention effective between Mexico and the EU
Member States.54 The conflict over whether the Convention
should be implemented through legislation that operates primarily
at the state or federal level has so far prevented any progress on
ratification in the United States. 5
II.The Problems of Proximity
As the above discussion indicates, there have been substantial
and significant developments on judgments recognition law in the
twenty-first century. Nonetheless, those developments have failed
to bring either full U.S. involvement in a global convention on the
recognition of judgments resulting from exclusive choice of court
48

See

HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE

CONVENTION OF 30 JUNE 2005

INTERNATIONAL LAW, PUBLICATIONS:

ON CHOICE OF COURT AGREEMENTS,

hcch.net/index-en.php?act=conventions.publications&dtid=35&cid=98
documents prepared as a result of this project) (last visited Mar. 22, 2015).
49 See HAGUE CONFERENCE, INTERIM TEXT, supra note 15.

http:/lwww.

(listing

50 CHOICE OF COURT CONVENTION, supra note 8; see also RONALD A. BRAND &
PAUL M. HERRUP, THE 2005 HAGUE CONVENTION ON CHOICE OF COURT AGREEMENTS

(Cambridge Univ. Press 2008) (providing commentary on the Convention).
51 See CHOICE OF COURT CONVENTION STATUS TABLE, supra note 9.
52 See id.

53 See Council Decision 2014/887, of 4 December 2014 on the approval of the
Hague Convention of 30 June 2005 on Choice of Court Agreements, 2014 O.J. (L 353) 5
(EU); see also Brussels I Recast Regulation, supra note 2.
54 See CHOICE OF COURT CONVENTION, supra note 8, art. 31 (noting that the
Convention goes into effect three months after the ratification or accession by at least
two states).
55 See supra notes 29-33.
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agreements, or EU termination of the discriminatory practice of
allowing exorbitant bases of jurisdiction to be used in Member
State courts in cases involving non-EU defendants and then
allowing the resulting judgments to circulate freely within the
courts of the Member States of the EU. These are important
impediments to the positive development of judgments recognition
law and practice.
In the remainder of this article I consider how problems of
proximity of both place and time have contributed to the failure to
move the development of judgments recognition law forward.
A. The Problem of Proximity of Place
The problem of proximity of place is clearly illustrated in the
way foreign judgments recognition law has been viewed in the
United States. In the United States, there is no single source of
law on the recognition of foreign judgments.56 While most statutes
and case law trace their origins to the 1895 U.S. Supreme Court
decision in Hilton,57 in most cases, including diversity cases in
federal courts, the law applied has become the law of the state in
which the court is located.58 While this makes for many sources of
legal rules, the result is mostly uniform in effect. The deference to
Justice Gray's analysis in Hilton has meant that, whether the
source is federal law in a federal question case, 59 under state
common law as most generally stated in the Restatement (Third)
Foreign Relations Law,6" the 1962 Uniform Foreign MoneyJudgments Recognition Act,6 ' or the 2005 Uniform ForeignCountry Money Judgments Recognition Act, 62 the analysis begins
with two rather simple rules. First, if the foreign judgment is final
and conclusive in the state in which it is rendered, there is a
presumption that it is to be recognized and enforced in the relevant

56 See Ronald A. Brand, Federal Judicial Center International Litigation Guide:
Recognition and Enforcement of ForeignJudgments, 74 U. PiTT. L. REV. 491, 494 (2013)
[hereinafter Brand, InternationalLitigation Guide].
57 Hilton, 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
58 See, e.g., Somportex Ltd. v. Phila. Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435 (3d Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1017 (1972).
59 See Brand, InternationalLitigation Guide, supra note 56, at 498-99.
60 See infra Section 2.E. 1.
61 See infra Section 2.E.2.
62 See infra Section 2.E.3.
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Second, this presumption is subject to a set of

grounds for non-recognition, all of which include the rule that a
judgment will not be recognized if the court of origin did not have
jurisdiction in accordance with U.S. rules of personal
jurisdiction.64
The focus on U.S. rules of personal jurisdiction for judgments
recognition purposes means that, in the United States, there is, for
the most part, no difference between the rules of direct jurisdiction
used to determine whether a particular U.S. court will be able to
hear a case in the first instance, and the rules of indirect
jurisdiction used to determine whether a foreign court had
jurisdiction sufficient to justify allowing recognition of the
resulting judgment in the United States. 65 The same personal
jurisdiction analysis generally applies in original cases and in
recognition cases, making the direct and indirect jurisdiction
"lists" the same.
It has been common for U.S. legal scholars to look to German
law as a source of comparison when demonstrating differences
between the U.S. common law system and civil law systems in
general.6 6 This usually makes sense because the German system is
quite similar to other European civil law systems and is, in fact, a
model on which many non-European civil law systems have been
developed. 67 Thus, it is no surprise that many U.S. commentators,
when considering judgments recognition law, have looked to
German law to demonstrate a significant civil law example. When
this is done, the focus leads to section 328(l) of the German Code

63 See infra Section 2.E.
64 See infra Section 4.A.2.
65 An example of a possible exception to this symmetry may be found in the 2005
Recognition Act, supra note 3, § 4(c)(6), which provides for discretionary nonrecognition "in the case of jurisdiction based only on personal service, the foreign court
was a seriously inconvenient forum for the trial of the action."
66 This is true, for example, particularly with the early editions of the classic
Schlesinger casebook on comparative law, which largely reflected Professor
Schlesinger's dual legal education in Germany and the United States. UGO A. MATTEI,
TEEMU RUSKOLA & ANTONIO GIDI, SCHLESINGER'S COMPARATIVE LAW (7th ed. 2009).
67 See generally Joseph Planck, The Survival of Roman Law, 51 AM. BAR Ass'N J.
259, 261 (1965) (explaining that both Asian and South American jurisdictions have
borrowed heavily from German civil law).
66 German Code of Civil Procedure, § 328(l), translation from I PHILIP WEEMS,
ENFORCEMENT OF MONEY JUDGMENTS ABROAD, FRG-29 (1993).
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of Civil Procedure. This section provides the bases for nonrecognition of a non-EU foreign judgment, and includes the rule
that "[t]he judgment of a foreign court shall not be recognized ...
if the courts of the State to which the foreign court belongs have
no jurisdiction under German law ...."" This rule is generally
interpreted to provide a test that mirrors the U.S. personal
jurisdiction test for judgments recognition purposes."

Thus, a

German court will not recognize the judgment of a foreign court
unless that foreign court had jurisdiction ("personal" jurisdiction in
U.S. parlance) consistent with German rules of (direct)
jurisdiction. Like the United States, Germany appears to have no
jurisdiction gap between its rules of direct and indirect jurisdiction.
The United States and Germany are not the only countries in
which no such jurisdiction gap exists. Brazil is an example of a
South American country in which there is no direct/indirect
jurisdiction gap.7° This means that legal system comparisons can
easily lead to the assumption that others - even civil law system
"others" - take the same approach as does the United States to
judgments recognition law. Such an assumption is, however,
misleading.
In a significant number of countries, the list of direct
jurisdictional bases - under which a court may exercise
jurisdiction in the original case - is much longer than the list of
indirect jurisdictional bases - under which a court may test a
foreign judgment for purposes of local recognition and
enforcement. For example, in Australia, the Foreign Judgments
Act 1991 (Cth) provides three common grounds of indirect
jurisdiction: (1) when the judgment debtor was a resident of the
foreign jurisdiction at the time of commencement of proceedings;
(2) when the judgment debtor voluntarily submitted to the
jurisdiction of the foreign court; or (3) when the judgment debtor
Id.
69 See, e.g., Somportex Ltd v. Phila. Chewing Corp., 453 F.2d 435 (1972).
70 Carmen Tiburcio & Luis Barroso, Recognition of ForeignJudgments in Brazil:
Notes on Brazilian Substantive and ProceduralPolicy, 2 PANORAMA OF BRAZILIAN L. 33,
35-36 (2014); Decreto-Lei No. 4.657, de 4 de Septembro de 1942, C.C. Art. 15(a);
Resolution No. 09, de 4 de Mayo de 2005, Art. 5(l). Decree no. 4.657/1942 does not list
a set of bases of indirect jurisdiction, but rather provides that a foreign judgment must
have been rendered by a "competent court." Whether that competence is determined by
Brazilian law or law of the state of the court of origin of the judgment, this would
eliminate any jurisdiction gap in Brazil.
68
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is a citizen of the foreign country.7 This is a much shorter list of
indirect jurisdictional bases than the list of direct jurisdictional
bases on which Australian courts may take jurisdiction over
foreign defendants in the first instance.72
Other Commonwealth states have similar jurisdictional gaps,
following the pattern in the United Kingdom.73 In 2014, however,
the Law Ministers of the Commonwealth States prepared a Model
Law Foreign Judgments Bill, which both drops the existing
reciprocity arrangement by which judgments from other
Commonwealth states receive favorable treatment as compared to
judgments from outside the Commonwealth, and sets forth a much
longer list of indirect bases of jurisdiction, thus providing for a
much-narrowed jurisdiction gap in the states that may enact the
Model Law.74 This move toward a decreased jurisdiction gap is a
very positive one, and it will be interesting to see just how many
of the Commonwealth states enact the Model Law.
B. The Problem of Proximity of Time
1. Hilton v. Guyot and the General Problem of Proximity
of Time
The problem of proximity of time is demonstrated in the
manner in which the seminal judgments recognition case in U.S.
history, Hilton,75 is often discussed. Justice Gray's 1895 opinion
clearly considered the issue of recognition of a French judgment in
a U.S. court to be a matter of international law, to be dealt with in
U.S. courts as federal common law.76 His analysis provided the
71 Australian Foreign Judgments Act 1991 (Cth) (Austi.).

In Australia, jurisdictional tests may vary by state and territory. Generally, there
are rather expansive grounds for direct jurisdiction, limited only by the "clearly
inappropriate forum test," established by the High Court of Australia in Voth v Manildra
FlourMills Pty Ltd. (1990) 171 CLR 538 (Austl.). Under this test, the burden of proving
that the court chosen by the plaintiff is a "clearly inappropriate forum" is on the
defendant who is seeking to set aside service outside Australia. See MARTIN DAVIES,
72

ANDREW S. BELL, & PAUL LE GAY BRERETON, NYGH'S CONFLICT OF LAWS IN AUSTRALIA

815-817 (9th ed. 2010).
73 See Meeting of Commonwealth Law Ministers and Senior Officials, Gaborone,
Botswana: 5-8 May 2014, Final Communique, http://thecommonwealth.org/media
/news/communique-commonwealth-law-ministers-meeting-2014.
74 See id.

75 Hilton, 159 U.S. 113, 113 (1895).
76 Id.
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foundation for all subsequent U.S. law, whether state or federal, on
the issue of judgments recognition.
Erie R.R. v. Tompkins" and its progeny have led to the general
application of state law in both state courts and federal courts
exercising diversity jurisdiction.78 Nonetheless, the source of the
law of judgments recognition in the United States draws its
genealogy from federal common law, and has clear foreign
relations implications that subject it to Congressional authority
over foreign commerce under Article I, § 8 of the United States
Constitution. Thus, the recent history of judgments recognition
law as largely state law can create a problem of proximity of time
that obscures important issues when considering how the law
should move forward in our relations with other countries in the
twenty-first century. This problem has most recently been
demonstrated in the debate over whether to implement the 2005
Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements through
federal or state law.79 That is not, however, the problem of
proximity of time I wish to address here.
The other problem of proximity of time results from the
language courts and commentators have, and have not, chosen as
their focus when considering Justice Gray's opinion in Hilton.
This problem can best be illustrated by first discussing the
language that has been at the core of the development of
judgments recognition law in the United States, and then by
considering other language of Justice Gray's opinion that is not
commonly discussed, but which appears to have been of distinct
importance to both the outcome of the case and the foundation for
the rule Justice Gray did apply.
2. Hilton Remembered. Comity with Limitations
The portion of Justice Gray's opinion from Hilton that has
formed the core for the development of judgments recognition law
in the United States begins with the concept of comity in
international relations. Just as foreign judgments from outside the

77 Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
78

See, e.g., Somportex Ltd. v. Phila. Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435 (1972).

See, e.g., BRAND & HERRUP, supra note 50; Stephen B. Burbank, A Tea Party at
The Hague, 18 Sw. J. INT'L L. 101 (2013); Stephen B. Burbank, Federalism and Private
InternationalLaw: Implementing the Hague Choice of Court Convention in the United
States (U. Penn Law School, 2006).
79
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European Union do not get the benefits of the generous
recognition and enforcement rules of the Brussels I Regulation,
judgments from outside the United States do not receive the
benefits of the Full Faith and Credit clause in Article IV of the
United States Constitution. 8" Justice Gray explained the concept
of comity in the following language, often quoted in U.S.
judgments recognition cases:
"Comity," in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute
obligation, on the one hand, nor a mere courtesy and good will,
upon the other. But it is the recognition which one nation allows
within its territory to the legislative, executive, or judicial acts of
another nation, having due regard both to international duty and
convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens, or of other
persons who are under the protection of its laws. 8
This was followed with the language that has provided the
foundation for both common law and statutes governing
judgments recognition in the United States, in which Justice Gray
explained that comity required recognition of a foreign judgment,
with certain limitations:
[W]here there has been opportunity for a full and fair trial
abroad before a court of competent jurisdiction, conducting the
trial upon regular proceedings, after due citation or voluntary
appearance of the defendant, and under a system of
jurisprudence likely to secure an impartial administration of
justice between the citizens of its own country and those of other
countries, and there is nothing to show either prejudice in the
court, or in the system of laws under which it was sitting, or
fraud in procuring the judgment, or any other special reason why
the comity of this nation should not allow it full effect, the
merits of the case should not, in an action brought in this country
upon the judgment, be tried afresh.82
Justice Gray considered the French judgment for which
recognition was requested to have satisfied this test, but
nonetheless held it was not entitled to recognition because
international law, applied as federal common law, also required

U.S. CONST. art. IV § I ("Full faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the
public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State ... .
81 Hilton, 159 U.S. at 144-45.
82 Id. at 158.
80
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reciprocity.83 Because French law did not clearly provide for the
recognition and enforcement of a U.S. judgment, the reciprocity
test was not met. 84 This reciprocity requirement of Justice Gray's
analysis has been remembered but rejected in all but a handful of
subsequent cases and state statutes.85
What has survived from Justice Gray's analysis is the
application of comity in a manner that presumes recognition,
subject to a list of bases for non-recognition. Thus, Justice Gray's
language of limitation is mirrored in section 482 of the
Restatement, 86 Article 4 of the 1962 Recognition Act,87 Article 5 of
the 2005 Recognition Act, 88 and section 5 of the ALl Proposed
Federal Statute.89
Thus, regardless of the source, U.S. judgments recognition law
assumes a presumption of recognition, subject to the possibility of
non-recognition based on one or more of the following grounds:
1)
lack of systemic due process
2)
lack of personal jurisdiction (under U.S. tests)
3)
lack of subject matter jurisdiction
4)
denial of notice and the opportunity to be heard
5)
fraud in the proceedings in the court of origin
6)
violation of public policy of the forum
7)
conflict with another inconsistent judgment entitled
to recognition
8)
conflict with a valid choice of court agreement
choosing a court other than the court of origin of
the judgment
9)
origination in an inconvenient forum in which it
would have been appropriate under a forum non
conveniens basis to refuse to adjudicate the case
83 Id. at 210-15.

Id. at 161-68.
See, e.g., Somportex, 453 F.2d at 440 (stating that the reciprocity requirement has
"received no more than desultory acknowledgment"). The case argued in combination
with Hilton v. Guyot involved a judgment from Ontario, which the Court determined did
provide for reciprocity with U.S. courts, resulting in the recognition of the judgment.
Ritchie v. McMullen, 159 U.S. 235 (1895).
84
85

86 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 482 (1987).
87
88

1962 Recognition Act, supra note 29.
2005 Recognition Act, supra note 3.

89 ALI ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS, supra note 6.
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questions regarding the integrity of the proceedings
in the court of origin
11)
due process problems in the proceedings in the
court of origin.9"
These bases for non-recognition are similar to those existing in
the 2005 Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements,
which includes the following grounds found in Article 9 for the
non-recognition of a judgment based on an exclusive choice of
court agreement:
a)
the agreement was null and void under the law of
the State of the chosen court, unless the chosen
court has determined that the agreement is valid;
b)
a party lacked the capacity to conclude the
agreement under the law of the requested State;
c)
the document which instituted the proceedings or
an equivalent document, including the essential
elements of the claim,
i)
was not notified to the defendant in sufficient
time and in such a way as to enable him to
arrange for his defence, unless the defendant
entered an appearance and presented his case
without contesting notification in the court of
origin, provided that the law of the State of
origin permitted notification to be contested; or
ii)
was notified to the defendant in the requested
State in a manner that is incompatible with
fundamental principles of the requested State
concerning service of documents;
d)
the judgment was obtained by fraud in connection
with a matter of procedure;
e)
recognition or enforcement would be manifestly
incompatible with the public policy of the requested
State, including situations where the specific
proceedings leading to the judgment were
incompatible with fundamental principles of
procedural fairness of that State;
f)
the judgment is inconsistent with a judgment given
10)

90 See Brand, InternationalLitigation Guide, supra note 56, at 13-23 (detailing the
grounds for non-recognition).
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in the requested State in a dispute between the same
parties; or
g)
the judgment is inconsistent with an earlier
judgment given in another State between the same
parties on the same cause of action, provided that
the earlier judgment fulfills the conditions
necessary for its recognition in the requested
State.9
Thus, Justice Gray's opinion in Hilton has served as the basis
for all subsequent law on judgments recognition in U.S. courts,
and fits well with the Convention on Choice of Court Agreements
which the United States negotiated with other states for global
rules on recognition when the judgment results from a case
brought in compliance with an exclusive choice of court
agreement. Nonetheless, additional language in Hilton provides
further context that may be useful as twenty-first century
developments of judgments recognition law move forward.
3. Hilton Forgotten:Beyond Comity

Generally lost from Justice Gray's analysis in Hilton is that he
considered the case before the Court to be of a particular category
that presented a more difficult case than did others.92 Thus, prior
to his discussion of his comity-plus-limitations rules for foreign
judgments recognition, he stated that there were other categories of
cases that presented a generally easier determination on the
question of recognition. In the less-commonly quoted portion of
Justice Gray's opinion, he states:
In order to appreciate the weight of the various authorities
cited at the bar, it is important to distinguish different kinds of
judgments. Every foreign judgment, of whatever nature, in
order to be entitled to any effect, must have been rendered by a
court having jurisdiction of the cause, and upon regular
proceedings, and due notice. In alluding to different kinds of

judgments, therefore, such jurisdiction, proceedings, and notice
will be assumed. It will also be assumed that they are untainted
by fraud, the effect of which will be considered later.
A judgment in rem, adjudicating the title to a ship or other
movable property within the custody of the court, is treated as
91

CHOICE OF COURT CONVENTION, supra note

92

See Hilton, 159 U.S. 113, 139 (1895).

8, art. 9.
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valid everywhere ....
A judgment affecting the status of persons, such as a decree
confirming or dissolving a marriage, is recognized as valid in
every country, unless contrary to the policy of its own law ....
Other judgments, not strictly in rem, under which a person
has been compelled to pay money, are so far conclusive that the
justice of the payment cannot be impeached in another country,
so as to compel him to pay it again. For instance, a judgment in
foreign attachment is conclusive, as between the parties, of the
right to the property or money attached ....
Other foreign judgments which have been held conclusive of
the matter adjudged were judgments discharging obligations
contracted in the foreign country between citizens or residents
thereof.
The extraterritorial effect of judgments in
personam, at law or in equity, may differ, according to the
parties to the cause. A judgment of that kind between two
citizens or residents of the country, and thereby subject to the
jurisdiction, in which it is rendered, may be held conclusive as
between them everywhere. So, if a foreigner invokes the
jurisdiction by bringing an action against a citizen, both may be
held bound by a judgment in favor of either. And if a citizen
sues a foreigner, and judgment is rendered in favor of the latter,
both may be held equally bound ....
The extraterritorial effect of judgments in personam, at law,
or in equity may differ, according to the parties to the cause. A
judgment of that kind between two citizens or residents of the
country, and thereby subject to the jurisdiction in which it is
rendered, may be held conclusive as between them everywhere.
So, if a foreigner invokes the jurisdiction by bringing an action
against a citizen, both may be held bound by a judgment in favor
of either; and if a citizen sues a foreigner, and judgment is
rendered in favor of the latter, both may be held equally
bound ....
The effect to which a judgment, purely executory, rendered in
favor of a citizen or resident of the country, in a suit there
brought by him against a foreigner, may be entitled in an action
thereon against the latter in his own country-as is the case now
before us-presents a more difficult93 question, upon which there
has been some diversity of opinion.

93

Id. at 144-46 (emphasis added).
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From this discussion, it is clear that Justice Gray considered
the judgment before the Court - a judgment in favor of a French
citizen and against a U.S. citizen - to be something different from
other classes of judgments.94 As to all judgments, he set up the
following requirements for recognition purposes:
1)
jurisdiction in the court of origin;
2)
regular proceedings in the court of origin;
3)
due notice given to the defendant; and
4)
the absence of fraud. 95
Beyond these fundamental requirements, the level of scrutiny
applied to each of the two categories of cases was different. The
first category, for which recognition was to be assumed, included
those cases in which:
1)
the judgment was purely in rem;
2)
the judgment determined the status of persons
"falling within its realm";
3)
the judgment was in attachment and limited to the
right to the property or money attached;
4)
judgments between two residents of the state of the
court of origin;
5)
judgments in which a foreigner invoked the
jurisdiction of the court of origin against a citizen
of the forum state; and
6)
judgments in which a citizen of the forum state
judgment was rendered in
sued a foreigner and the
96
foreigner.
the
of
favor
In these cases, Justice Gray found the analysis to be rather
simple. The placement of either the property or the judgment
debtor in the state of the court of origin is grounds for giving
substantial deference to the decision of that court. Similarly,
where the judgment debtor chose the forum, that party should be
Justice Gray was more
bound by the resulting judgment.
concerned about the case in which a forum plaintiff (here a
Frenchman in a French court) sued a foreign defendant (here a
U.S. citizen) and sought recognition of the resulting judgment.97

94

See id.

95 Id. at 144.
96
97

Id. at 144-46.
Id. at 198.
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This is the type of case that raises questions of equity.
This aspect of Justice Gray's opinion did receive attention in
subsequent early cases, even in the single case most commonly
cited for moving judgments recognition law to the competence of
the states prior to Erie. In Johnston v. Compagnie Generale
98 the New York Court of Appeals considered the
Transatlantique,
argument that Hilton was controlling precedent in state courts, but
rejected it, stating that:
the question is one of private rather than public international
law, of private right rather than public relations, and our courts
will recognize private rights acquired under foreign laws and the
sufficiency of the evidence establishing such rights. A right
acquired under a foreign judgment may be established in this
state without reference to the rules of evidence laid down by the
courts of the United States. Comity is not a rule of law, but it is
a rule of 'practice, convenience and expediency .... It therefore
rests, not on the basis of reciprocity, but rather upon the
persuasiveness of the foreign judgment. 99
However, the Johnston court specifically acknowledged that
the case before it was one of Justice Gray's easy cases, and not the
more difficult type of case faced in Hilton, stating that Justice
Gray
limits his discussion ... to the effect which a judgment, purely
executory, rendered in favor of a citizen or resident of France in
a suit there brought by him against a citizen of the United States,
may be entitled to in an action thereon in the United States.
Here the plaintiff was the actor in the French court [who] now
seeks to impeach the judgment rendered against him. The
principles of comity should give conclusiveness to such a
judgment as a bar to the present action.' 00
Thus, the case most often cited for taking the Hilton analysis
on the path towards becoming state law is also the case that seems
to have most remembered the distinction Justice Gray found so
important. However, as with Hilton, this aspect of the Johnston
case seems to have been given little, if any, attention in subsequent
cases and commentary.

98 242 N.Y. 381, 381 (1926).
99 Id.

at 381,387.

100 Id. at 388 (emphasis added).
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4. Revisiting Hilton to ConsiderBoth the Context and
the Rule
When we consider Justice Gray's opinion in Hilton in the
context of twenty-first century developments in judgments
recognition law, two possible methods of cataloguing types of
cases present themselves. The first is based on the permutations
possible in a simple two-party context to litigation - the approach
taken by Justice Gray. The second is focused on what have
become standard types of jurisdictional rules, both in state longarm statutes in the United States and in the civil law approach
represented by the Brussels I Regulation in theEuropean Union.
a.

Consideringthe Partiesand the Outcome

If we look at a judgment coming from a foreign court in terms
of the parties and the outcome, we can project eight possible
situations:
1)
home plaintiff, home defendant, judgment for the
plaintiff;
2)
home plaintiff, home defendant, judgment for the
defendant;
3)
foreign plaintiff, home defendant, judgment for the
plaintiff;
4)
foreign plaintiff, home defendant, judgment for the
defendant;
5)
home plaintiff, foreign defendant, judgment for the
plaintiff;
6)
home plaintiff, foreign defendant, judgment for the
defendant;
7)
foreign plaintiff, foreign defendant, judgment for
the plaintiff; and
8)
foreign plaintiff, foreign defendant, judgment for
the defendant.'o
Setting aside discussion of judgments granted as a result of in
rem and quasi in rem jurisdiction, categories (1), (2), (3), (4), (6),
and (8) are Justice Gray's easy cases. Each involves a situation
where the judgment is rendered either against a national of the

101 In each of these examples, the word "home" is used to refer to a citizen or
national of the state of the court of origin, and the word "foreign" is used to refer to a
party who is not a citizen or national of the court of origin.
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state of the court of origin, or against the party bringing the claim
in the court of origin. The idea that a national of the state of the
court of origin and a party choosing the court of origin in which to
bring the claim should be bound by the result is not a difficult one
to comprehend. That was Justice Gray's starting point.
Categories (5) and (7) represent Justice Gray's more difficult
cases, and include the facts considered in Hilton. In each of these
situations, the judgment debtor is neither a national of the state of
the court of origin nor the party originating the claim on which the
judgment is granted.
Using this categorization, we can revisit Justice Gray's opinion
in Hilton to determine that:
1)
All judgments from foreign courts will be tested in
order to require:
a)
jurisdiction in the court of origin;
b)
regular proceedings in the court of origin;
c)
due notice given to the defendant; and
d)
the absence of fraud. 02
2)
Beyond these basic grounds for non-recognition, if
a foreign judgment is rendered either against a nonnational of the state of the court of origin or against
the party that did not bring the claim on which the
judgment is based, further testing of the judgment is
justified.
This analysis raises the question of just what further testing is
warranted. In Hilton, it was the reciprocity test. °3 This was the
additional analysis applied to the French judgment being
considered, ultimately holding that the failure of French courts to
grant recognition to judgments from U.S. courts justified denial of
recognition of the French judgment, in favor of a French plaintiff,
against a U.S. defendant. 0 4 That test has, however, been
uniformly rejected by case law and Uniform Act, 0 5 even though it
is included in the ALl Proposed Federal Statute,0 6 and a few state
102 See Hilton, 159 U.S. at 144-45; infra Part 3(b)(2).

103 See Hilton, 159 U.S. at 144-45.
See id. at 161-68.
105 See, e.g., Somportex., 453 F.2d at 435. Neither the 1962 nor the 2005
Recognition Act provides a reciprocity basis for non-recognition, although a small
handful of states have enacted a statute with such a requirement.
104

106 ALl ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS, supra note 6, § 7.
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statutes.1

Consideringthe Bases of Jurisdictionin the
Court of Origin
A different approach to understanding Justice Gray's context
and rule in twenty-first century U.S. law on judgments recognition
is to consider the court of origin's basis of jurisdiction over the
resulting judgment debtor. Taking the categorization set out above
as a starting point, categories (1), (2), (3), and (6) all involve a
judgment against a national of the state of the court of origin.
Thus, jurisdiction existed over that party on the basis of general
jurisdiction at the judgment debtor's "home" or domicile, now
confirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court in both Goodyear and
Bauman to be an appropriate test.18 Categories (4) and (8) both
involve judgment debtors who brought the claim in the court of
origin upon which the judgment is based. Thus, they explicitly
consented to the jurisdiction of the court that rendered the
judgment. In other words, Justice Gray's easy cases (other than in
rem and quasi in rem cases) all involve either general jurisdiction
or consent jurisdiction over the judgment debtor.
Justice Gray's more difficult cases, categories (5) and (7)
above, involve neither general jurisdiction nor consent jurisdiction
over the judgment debtor. Rather, they commonly are cases in
which the basis of jurisdiction in the court of origin was what in
the U.S. is referred to as "specific" jurisdiction,0 9 and in Europe as
"special" jurisdiction." 0 These bases of jurisdiction can be both
the most tenuous in terms of the relationship between the court and
the party over whom authority is exercised in granting the
judgment (in fact, in the Brussels I Regulation, they often require
only a connection between the court and the claim, and not a
connection with the defendant), and the least well-settled in the
law of both the United States and Europe."'
b.

107 See Brand, InternationalLitigation Guide, supra note 56, at 1-2.

108 See infra Section 3, accompanying notes 39-46 (discussing how the U.S.
Supreme Court decides cases of general jurisdiction).
109 See, e.g., McIntyre Machinery, Ltd., 131 S. Ct. at 2794-95.
110 See Brussels I Recast Regulation, supra note 2, art. 7.

111 See generally Ronald A. Brand, JurisdictionalDevelopments and the New Hague
Judgments Project, A COMMITMENT
HONOUR OF HANS VAN LOON

89 (2013).
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IV. Bringing the Proximity Problems Together to Improve Our
Understanding of Judgments Recognition Law for TwentyFirst Century Purposes
While it may appear that the two problems of proximity
discussed above are unrelated, they do have an intersection in
effect that has important implications as the United States moves
forward in considering judgments recognition law. In most
countries in which a jurisdiction gap exists, the bases of indirect
jurisdiction on which recognition is granted include traditional
concepts of general jurisdiction and consent. Thus, the indirect
jurisdiction list in most countries in which a jurisdiction gap exists
includes the bases of jurisdiction that reflect the set of cases
Justice Gray found to be the easy cases. While the United States
has not categorized such cases by jurisdictional bases or by
creating the equivalent of the jurisdiction gap that exists in some
other countries, the historical context for its law on judgments
recognition reflects the acknowledgment of similar categorization
- but without the intentional discriminatory purpose and effect
which defines the jurisdiction gap systems. Understanding this
similarity between Justice Gray's categories and the jurisdiction
gap in many other countries indicates some identifiable similarities
across legal systems, and may provide context for understanding
the problems that face global efforts to negotiate a judgments
recognition convention at the Hague Conference on Private
International Law.
The similarities between the jurisdiction gap and Justice
Gray's categories at least imply the possibility of obtaining
agreement on recognition and enforcement of the "easy"
judgments recognition cases, where the judgment is from a court
in the state of the defendant's domicile or the judgment debtor is
the party that brought the claim on which the judgment is based.
In Justice Gray's analysis, the more difficult cases involve neither
a judgment debtor domiciled in the state of the court of origin nor
a judgment debtor who brought the claim on which the judgment
is based, and thus, in jurisdictional terms, tend to result from cases
originally based only on special/specific bases of jurisdiction.
The existence of a direct/indirect jurisdiction gap does result in
discrimination against judgments from foreign courts, quite often
against foreign plaintiffs who have received judgments against
defendants domiciled in (and thus keeping their assets in) the
recognizing state. It also results in trade distortion when some
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countries - like the United States, Germany, Brazil, and others recognize foreign judgments based on all bases of direct
jurisdiction recognized in their own legal systems, and other
countries recognize foreign judgments based on a much smaller
list of jurisdictional bases than applies when they test their own
jurisdiction to adjudicate cases involving foreign defendants.
The general trend for more than half a century in international
economic law has been to use treaties to move toward (and even to
require) non-discrimination." 2 Three factors, however, make it
extremely difficult to move toward complete elimination of the
jurisdiction gap approach to judgments recognition on a global
basis. The first is that the European Union has embraced this
discriminatory approach to judgments recognition, despite the
European Commission's efforts to reduce the effects of such
discrimination in its original proposal for the Brussels I Recast
Regulation. The second is that most other countries follow the
Continental civil law approach to law generally, including on rules
of private international law.
The third is that, as the
Commonwealth example demonstrates, even among the common
law legal systems of the world, the United States tends to be an
outlier in having no jurisdiction gap.
In the United States, the Due Process clauses of both the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments apply to both citizens and foreigners
alike (persons, not citizens, are the subject of the due process
benefits)." 3 Thus, there is constitutional foundation for having the
same rules applicable as both direct and indirect jurisdictional
tests. The infusion of the law of jurisdiction with constitutional
status, beginning in 1878 with Pennoyer v. Neff,"4 means that it
would be very difficult - perhaps impossible without a
constitutional amendment - for the United States itself to now
move to a clearly defined direct/indirect jurisdiction gap. Even

112 See World Trade Organization, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Arts. I
& II (1986), available at https://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal e/gatt47_e.pdf.
Two of the pillars of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, now administered by
the World Trade Organization have been the Article I most-favored-nation treatment
obligation and the Article III national-treatment obligation.
Id. These prevent
discrimination in international trade, either in favor of goods from third countries or in
favor of domestic industries. Id. These same non-discrimination obligations are found
in most regional trade agreements and bilateral investment treaties. Id.
113 U.S. CoNsT. amends. V, XIV.

114 95 U.S. 714(1877).
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such a gap in a treaty would not likely prevent broader recognition
and enforcement under existing law that would apply when the
judgment is outside the coverage of the treaty. While it may be
arguable that the Due Process clause should apply differently to
indirect jurisdiction than to direct jurisdiction, there exists no clear
basis in case law for that position, and the constitutional
questionability of such a position makes it a less-than-desirable
basis on which to found U.S. positions in international
negotiations.
U.S. jurisprudence, which makes judicial jurisdiction in private
civil cases a constitutional matter, is partially responsible for the
United States becoming one of the most liberal jurisdictions in
which to obtain recognition and enforcement of a foreign
judgment.
However, in countries in which a significant
jurisdiction gap exists between rules of direct jurisdiction and rules
of indirect jurisdiction, there appears to be no ability to appeal to a
higher order of law to prevent the resulting discrimination." 5 The
goal going forward should be to use available mechanisms to
reduce the existence and impact of the jurisdiction gap which
results in such discrimination.
A move toward global rules on judgments recognition that
embrace discrimination in international trade certainly should not
be the first option. Nonetheless, if we acknowledge the existing
jurisdiction gap in many countries, and recognize recent efforts to
substantially reduce that gap, we can find grounds for hope on the
international front. While the perfect result of a judgments

IIs It is interesting that Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights
seems not to have been interpreted to apply to prevent a discriminatory jurisdiction gap
in civil cases in states party to that Convention, and one might ask if a case could be
successfully made that such international law rules could be applied in that manner.
European Convention on Human Rights, art. 6, available at http://www.
echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf.
Neither has the procedure for
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments been challenged as a discriminatory
border measure under the National Treatment provisions of Article III of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, supra
note 112, art. III. It may be that the Section 337 Case, brought successfully by the
European Community against the United States in the early 1990's provides the basis for
such a challenge. See Ronald A. Brand, Private Partiesand GATT Dispute Resolution:
Implications of the Panel Report on Section 337 of the US Tariff Act of 1930, 24 J.
WORLD TRADE 5 (1990). At this time, however, the jurisdiction gap represented in the
law of a significant number of important trading states may have become both the
irresistible force and the immovable object.
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recognition regime based on the elimination of any jurisdiction
gap in any country may not be possible, it may be possible to build
an international regime that can achieve the goals of: (1)
expanding the recognition of judgments across borders; (2)
reducing transaction costs for parties to cross-border litigation; and
(3) reducing the effect of existing jurisdiction gaps so as to also
reduce the discriminatory effect of such gaps.

